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should not be read as an isolated example with little future
significance. While its impact certainly will be felt by sentenc-
ing judges, it also may alter the entire sentencing procedure.
Additionally, Sepulvado calls for the supreme court to reassess
its position on the constitutionality of mandatory sentences.
Barry L. LaCour
DRUG SMUGGLING AND THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE: A JOURNEY
INTO UNCHARTED WATERS
The defendant was indicted on charges of conspiring to
import marijuana,' possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute,2 and attempting to import marijuana.3 He filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment, alleging lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, since the acts in question occured on the high seas
outside of United States territory. The United States District
Court in Puerto Rico held (1) the defendant's planned invasion
of United States customs territory was a sufficient basis for the
invocation of subject matter jurisdiction under the protective
theory, and (2) the defendant's vessel was subject to the special
maritime jurisdiction of the United States. United States v.
Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1978).1
The protective principle is one of the six bases recognized
in international law for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
a sovereign state.' According to this principle, a sovereign state
1. 21 U.S.C. § 952, 963 (1970).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 952, 963 (1970).
4. This note will focus on the use of the protective principle to establish subject
matter jurisdiction.
5. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 445 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Research]. See also United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968); Rivard
v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967).
The other five bases of jurisdiction are set out as follows: (1) The territorial
principle is based on the absolute sovereignty of a state within its boundaries; it may
prosecute all who commit a crime within its territory. (2) Jurisdiction over nationals
rests on the allegiance due a state by its citizens and the inherent authority which it
has over them. (3) The objective territorial principle allows a state to exercise jurisdic-
tion over those who act outside of its territory so as to intentionally cause a criminal
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has jurisdiction to prosecute those who commit acts outside of
its territory which have a potentially adverse effect on its secu-
rity or governmental functions, even though no criminal effect
actually occurs within the state.'
The protective principle has been used very infrequently
in the United States, the territorial and nationality principles
generally being relied upon to establish jurisdiction over crimi-
nal offenses.' The protective principle has, however, been used
to establish jurisdiction over the offense of making false state-
ments on visa applications at United States consulates.' In
addition, the American Law Institute has recognized that,
should Congress decide to proscribe the counterfeiting of
United States currency outside of the United States, jurisdic-
tion over that offense could be based on the protective princi-
ple.'
One reason for the scant use of the protective principle
may lie in the fact that the courts have not always understood
how to employ it. In Rocha v. United States, 0 for example, the
defendant was charged with making a false statement on a visa
application. Although the court seemed to recognize that the
protective principle was applicable, it "still felt constrained to
say that jurisdiction rested partially on the adverse effect pro-
duced as a result of the alien's entry into the United States.""
In addition, the court evidenced its confusion regarding the
basis of jurisdiction by citing two cases in which jurisdiction
effect within the state. (4) Universal jurisdiction is premised on the belief that certain
crimes, such as piracy and slavery, constitute crimes against humanity so that every
state has the right to punish those who commit them. (5) Special maritime jurisdiction
is based on the right of control which a state has over its flag vessels on the high seas.
Harvard Research, supra.
6. Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 543. See also United States v. Pizzarusso,
388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
7. See note 5, supra. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 33, note 1 (1965); Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 544. See
also United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp.
479 (S.D. Cal. 1960); United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
33(2), illus. 1 (1965).*
10. 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
11. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
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was based on the objective territorial principle as support for
its use of the protective principle." In United States v. Baker '3
another court was faced with a factual situation similar to that
in Rocha. The court in Baker held that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter; it incorrectly believed that the
protective principle was applicable only to acts committed
abroad by American citizens, and not to those committed by
foreigners. 4
Later decisions, however, have shown an increased under-
standing of the protective principle. United States v.
Pizzarusso, 1' for example, also involved false statements on a
visa application. There the court correctly applied the protec-
tive principle, noting that there need not be any actual effect
within the United States caused by the defendant's acts, but
only a potentially adverse effect. In the course of its decision,
the court criticized the reasoning in Rocha and said that it
would have upheld jurisdiction in the Baker case based on the
protective principle."
The argument could be made that the tendency of Ameri-
can courts to analyze jurisdiction over acts committed abroad
solely in terms of the nationality or objective territorial princi-
ples indicates a limitation on the ability of the courts to employ
the protective principle."7 In view of its recognition in interna-
12. The court cited Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911) and United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In Strassheim the defendant
obtained money by false pretenses from the state of Michigan through the mail; the
court in Michigan had jurisdiction because the effect occurred there. 221 U.S. at 285.
In the Aluminum case, defendant was charged under the Sherman Act with organizing
a foreign cartel with the intent to affect imports into the United States; the jurisdiction
of the American court was based on the effect in the United States. 148 F.2d at 444-
45.
13. 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
14. Id. at 547-48.
15. 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. Id. at 11.
17. In United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), an analogous argu-
ment was made. The defendant contended that only the territorial and protective
principles had been used as bases for jurisdiction by American courts and attempted
to show that the case law fell within only these two jurisdictional approaches. Defen-
dant thus argued that the court had no jurisdiction over the offenses, because they were
not committed within the United States and did not fall under the protective principle.
The court rejected this argument. Id. at 851. A similar argument could be made
19791
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tional law, however, the fact that the protective principle has
been used only sparingly in the past should not be construed
as barring the courts from making greater use of it today. Com-
menting on this history of sparse usage, the court in United
States v. Rodriguez" said:
From the body of international law, the Congress may
pick and choose whatever recognized principle of interna-
tional jurisdiction is necessary to accomplish the purposes
sought by the legislation. The mere fact that, in the past,
Congress may not have seen fit to embody in legislation
the full scope of its authorized powers is not a basis for
now finding that those powers are lacking. 9
Thus, in the proper circumstances, the United States can
widen the scope of its criminal jurisdiction by means of the
protective principle.
In the instant case, the defendant's vessel, the Great
Mystery, was first sighted by a United States Coast Guard
helicopter on the high seas2 thirty miles north of Arecibo,
Puerto Rico, heading in a westerly direction toward the United
States. Since the vessel was suspected of being used to smuggle
contraband,2 ' a Coast Guard cutter was sent to investigate.
When questioned by the Coast Guard, a crew member stated
that the Great Mystery was a United States vessel with an
American crew and that they were bound for Port Everglades,
because of the very infrequent use of the protective principle in the past. See text at
note 7, supra.
18. 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
19. Id. at 491.
20. In order to understand what is meant by "high seas" in the technical sense,
one must consider the divisions of ocean space. Waters lying landward of the baseline
are termed internal waters and are subject to the absolute sovereignty of the coastal
state. Territorial waters are those lying next to the coast; the coastal state has nearly
absolute sovereignty over these waters. The United States claims a three mile terri-
torial limit; customary international law probably allows a twelve mile limit. Special
contiguous zones are those waters beyond the territorial sea in which the coastal state
has limited, specifically defined competence, such as the exclusive right to manage
fisheries located there. The high seas are the ocean space lying beyond the seaward
limit of the territorial sea. H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS,
READINGS at xxxiv (1977).
21. The Great Mystery was on a list of vessels suspected of being used to violate
United States' laws. The list is published weekly by the United States Coast Guard.
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Florida. A routine administrative search was conducted by the
Coast Guard," during which approximately 1300 pounds of
marijuana were discovered in the hold. The crew was placed
under arrest and returned to San Juan, where they were in-
dicted.
The defendant's motion for dismissal alleged that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses, since
the vessel had been outside of United States territorial waters
at the time of the seizure. The court agreed that all of the acts
in question had taken place on the high seas, but found that
the planned invasion of the United States customs territory did
have a potentially adverse effect on security and governmental
functions, specifically the customs law, which prohibits the
importation of certain controlled substances." This was suffi-
cient, in the court's opinion, to justify the exercise of jurisdic-
tion under the protective principle with respect to counts one
and three, conspiracy to import and attempting to import mar-
ijuana.
The court found, however, that it did not have jurisdiction
over count two of the indictment, possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute, under the protective theory. 4 Although the
basis for this decision was not stated in the opinion, the court
apparently reasoned that the federal statutes proscribing con-
spiracy to import and attempting to import marijuana could be
applied extraterritorially, but that the statute proscribing pos-
session with intent to distribute could be applied only within
the boundaries of the United States. To determine whether a
statute should be given extraterritorial application, the court
first had to consider whether Congress intended to proscribe
the offense in question even when it is committed beyond the
territory of the United States.
Federal statutes are generally presumed to apply only
22. A routine administrative search involves an inspection of the ship's papers,
which requires going into the hold in order to confirm the vessel's number on the main
beam, and a check for compliance with safety regulations. The Coast Guard is autho-
rized to make such searches. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1950).
23. 451 F. Supp. at 635. The court apparently believed that the attempt to
import marijuana injures a governmental function, since it mentioned the customs
laws. See also 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1970).
24. 451 F. Supp. at 635 n.8.
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within the territory of the United States.25 In order to overcome
this presumption, it must be shown that Congress clearly in-
tended the statute to have extraterritorial effect, 6 or that the
purpose of the statute would be defeated unless it were given
extraterritorial application. 7 In Brulay v. United States,28 the
court considered the extraterritorial application of the federal
conspiracy statute 9 and the federal smuggling statute.3 It
noted that "[slince smuggling by its very nature involves for-
eign countries, and since the accomplishment of the crime al-
ways requires some action in a foreign country, we have no
difficulty inferring that Congress did intend that the provisions
of [the smuggling statute] should extend to foreign countries
.... ,"3' The high seas are not, strictly speaking, foreign territory
because they are not subject to the exclusive sovereignty of any
one state. Nonetheless, applying these same principles of inter-
pretation to counts one and three, it could be seen that the
federal statute proscribing conspiracy to import and attempt-
ing to import controlled substances 3 should be given extraterri-
torial application. To limit its application to United States
territory would seriously hinder its purpose, which is prevent-
ing the importation of certain substances.3 3 If the statute's
applicability were limited to the United States, this would
mean that the government could only act once the substances
had in fact been introduced into the United States.
Count two of the indictment, however, charges a violation
of a statute which proscribes the mere possession of a con-
trolled substance with the intent to distribute. 34 As such it
proscribes a crime of status, i.e., one which consists of a condi-
tion and not an act.35 The purpose of the statute, which is to
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
38, note 1 (1965).
26. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977).
27. Id.
28. 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1955).
31. 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1970).
33. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4566, 4637-39.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
35. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REv.
1194 [Vol. 39
limit the illegal distribution of drugs within the United
States,3 would not be hindered if the statute were held to apply
only within the United States. Absent a specific indication of
Congressional intent to the contrary, it will not be extended to
foreign countries. Therefore, in order to uphold jurisdiction
over count two, the court had to determine if the vessel -was
subject to the special maritime jurisdiction of the United
States, in which case it would be subject to its criminal juris-
diction.
The statute defining the special maritime jurisdiction pro-
vides that a vessel which belongs in whole or in part to an
American citizen is subject to this jurisdiction.3 7 In determin-
ing whether this statute was applicable, the court was faced
with an issue of first impression, namely the interpretation of
the words '"belonging to" in the phrase "any vessel belonging
in whole or in part to . . .any citizen . . .[of the United
States]."38 The court interpreted this phrase to mean owner-
ship3" and, after considering the facts, held that the vessel was
subject to the special maritime jurisdiction.4" This being so, the
court held that it had jurisdiction over count two and stated
that the special maritime jurisdiction could also serve as a
basis for jurisdiction over counts one and three." It is impor-
tant to note that the court did not have to apply the special
maritime jurisdiction to counts one and three, since jurisdic:
tion based on the protective principle alone was sufficient for
these counts. If the court had been able to obtain jurisdiction
by relying on a previously established judicial interpretation of
the special maritime jurisdiction statute, there would have
been no need to consider the applicability of the protective
principle. Special maritime jurisdiction by itself would have
1203, 1203 (1953); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 CAL. L. REv. 557, 558 (1960).
36. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4566, 4571-72.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1952).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1952).
39. 451 F. Supp. at 636. The court based its decision on the definition of
"belonging" in Black's Law Dictionary, which includes ownership. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 198 (4th ed. 1968).
40. 451 F. Supp. at 637.
41. Id. at 635.
1979] NOTES 1195
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
been sufficient for all three counts. But faced with a case of first
impression, the court advanced two separate bases for its juris-
diction, apparently so that in the event its application of spe-
cial maritime jurisdiction to count two were overruled, it would
still have jurisdiction over counts one and three.
-In this analysis of jurisdictional bases, the court was care-
ful to distinguish the protective from the objective territorial
principle of jurisdiction, correctly pointing out that the former
requires only a potentially adverse effect on' security or govern-
mental functions, while the latter requires an actual effect
within the state.2 This distinction is important, for if the court
had confused the protective with the objective territorial prin-
ciple, it would not have had jurisdiction since no actual effect
ever occurred within the United States.
By applying the protective principle of jurisdiction to con-
spiracies and attempts to violate the United States customs
laws, the court has fashioned an effective tool for use in the
effort to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
Its effectiveness becomes evident in light of the Congressional
grant of authority to the Coast Guard to "go on board of any
vessel subject to the jurisdiction . . . of the United States,...
and examine, inspect and search the vessel . . . ."" The statute
is not limited on its face to United States vessels;" thus, if a
foreign vessel on the high seas is subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States by way of the protective principle, members
of the Coast Guard may stop and search it if they suspect it is
being used to smuggle drugs.45
It should be kept in mind, however, that the Coast Guard's
right to board a foreign vessel is limited by the treaty obliga-
tions of the United States and by the rules of customary inter-
national law." Article 22 of the 1958 Convention on the High
42. Id.
43. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1950).
44. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. For the constitutional implications of a "stop and search" on the high seas,
see Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51 (1977).
46. Among the sources of international law are treaties, custom, and general
principles of law derived from the major legal systems of the world. G. SCHWARZENBER-
GER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-28 (6th ed. 1976). Customary
international law consists of principles derived from the general practices of states
which have become accepted by them as binding rules of law. Id. at 26.
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Seas47 greatly limits the instances in which a warship" of one
party to the convention may board a merchant ship of another
party. Boarding is permitted only if there are grounds to sus-
pect that the merchant ship is engaged in piracy or the slave
trade, or that the ship is really of the same nationality as the
warship, although it is flying no flag or the flag of another
nation.4"
Although the 1958 Convention on the High Seas was an
attempt to codify those rules of customary international law
which were applicable to the legal regime of the oceans,50 all
such rules were not in fact codified. Professor McDougal has
criticized article 22 as being misleading, noting that "[a]n
examination of Article 22 does not complete the inquiry neces-
sary to discover the measures a state may take on the high seas
to enforce exclusive national regulations otherwise in conform-
ity with international law."'" In other words, since customary
international law recognizes that coastal states may proscribe
certain conduct on the high seas to protect national security
interests, as well as custom, health, or sanitation laws, this
right to proscribe must logically be accompanied by a right to
enforce the proscription in a reasonable manner." Thus, "the
occasions for permissible visit and search under customary in-
ternational law [extend] much beyond suspici6ns of piracy
and slave trade. . . .. They logically include those instances
in which a coastal state is justfied in proscribing or authorizing
certain conduct on the high seas to protect its security or eco-
nomic interests. 54
47. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200 (effective September 30, 1962) (hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the High
Seasi.
48. A Coast Guard vessel is considered to be a warship. Compare Maul v. United
States, 274 U.S. 501, 515 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) with 1958 Convention on
the High Seas art. 8(2), supra note 47.
49. 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 47, art. 22.
50. The preamble to the convention states that its drafters desired "to codify the
rules of international law relating to the high seas .... " 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 47, preamble.
51. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 893 (1962).
52. Id. at 885.
53. Id. at 889.
54. Id. at 885.
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As a signatory to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,
the United States is limited by article 22 with respect to the
instances in which a warship of the United States may stop and
board a merchant vessel of another party to the convention.
The terms of the convention, where applicable, supersede
"prior domestic law to the contrary,"55 which includes the Con-
gressional grant of authority to the Coast Guard to board ves-
sels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This limi-
tation does not, however, extend to the vessels of nations which
are not parties to the convention,5" nor to stateless vessels."
The United States' conduct with respect to such vessels is con-
trolled, in the absence of a treaty, by customary international
law, which, as noted above, permits a right of visit and search
in more instances than does article 22.58 Because of this, the use
of the Coast Guard's authority to board vessels based on juris-
diction under the protective principle can still be of assistance
in the effort to stop the traffic in illegal drugs. Much of this
traffic originates in Colombia,59 and Colombian and Panama-
nian vessels are frequently used." Since neither Panama nor
Colombia are parties to the 1958 Convention, the right of the
Coast Guard to stop and board them upon reasonable suspicion
of drug smuggling is not curtailed by article 22 of the 1958
Convention. Nor is the right to board limited by customary
international law, since under that body of law it is recognized
that states may proscribe conduct on the high seas which af-
fects its customs laws or its security, and enforce these pros-
criptions in a reasonable manner. Since customary interna-
tional law permits a right of visit and search in more circum-
stances than does article 22, the United States should carefully
consider the effect which a limitation such as article 22 has on
American drug enforcement efforts before agreeing to similar
55. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978).
56. Id. at 1261.
57. United States v. Cortes, No. 78-1734, slip op. (5th Cir., January 16, 1979).
A stateless vessel is one which is not legally entitled to fly the flag of any nation.
See generally H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 309-23 (1967).
58. See note 46, supra, and accompanying text.




language in other treaties.'
The objection may be raised that the use of the protective
principle to allow the Coast Guard to search foreign vessels on
the high seas represents unwarranted interference with the
freedom of the seas. The concept of freedom of the seas at-
tempts to guarantee the most unrestricted use of the seas by
all nations. This ideal has not, however, been embodied in a
sacrosanct rule.62 Rather, it is flexible enough to respond to
changing circumstances and the often divergent needs of the
individual states.
The rules of international law applicable to the seas have
developed out of the resolution of the conflicting claims of
states. 3 Some states, for example, want greater freedom of the
seas, while others claim the right to assert greater control over
portions of the seas. Professor McDougal has stated that this
process involves a balancing of the conflicting claims, with due
consideration given to the interests of the community of na-
tions, in an attempt to promote the least restricted use of the
seas. 4 He also states that "the public order of the oceans then
protects a state only in such occasional assertions of authority
and iuse as are determined to be reasonable .... ,"I' Thus, the
indiscriminate use of the protective principle to allow boarding
of foreign vessels would not be tolerated, but a reasonable use
would be justified. What is reasonable will, of course, vary with
the circumstances. Factors to be considered in determining
reasonableness include the authority claimed by the coastal
state, the opposition of other states to this claimed authority,
61. The United States is currently participating in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, one purpose of which is the drafting of a new multi-
lateral convention on the legal regime of the seas. Proposed article 110 of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text closely tracks the language of article 22 of the 1958 Con-
vention. If this text is adopted by the United States and other nations, and should such
a treaty enter into force, it could severely limit the Coast Guard's authority to search
foreign vessels suspected of drug smuggling. Compare Informal Composite Negotiating
Text art. 110, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/WP.10 (1977) with 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 47, art. 22.
62. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 51, at 797.
63. H. KNIGHT, supra note 20, at xli-xlii; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note
51, at 2.
64. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 50, at 56.
65. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
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and the extent and nature of the interference caused by the
claimed authority." Measured against these standards, it can
be argued that the proposed limited use of the protective prin-
ciple is reasonable.
That such a use of the protective principle is in fact rea-
sonable becomes apparent when one considers the nature of the
problem which the United States faces. Given the severity of
the drug problem,67 it might be argued that the court in Keller
has not so much expanded the meaning of "governmental func-
tions" to include customs laws as it has assimilated attempts
to import drugs to acts directed against the security of the
United States. The classification of the interest injured as ei-
ther a security interest or a governmental function has no effect
on the jurisdictional question, since injuries to both such inter-
ests come under the protective principle. It is, however, easier
to show the reasonableness of an action taken to protect a
security interest as opposed to a governmental function.
The justification for the United States' assertion of the
right to stop and board foreign vessels suspected of smuggling
drugs is obvious when one considers the need to prevent the
importation 'of drugs. Provided that the proper diplomatic
groundwork has been laid, 8 it is difficult to imagine that an-
other nation would protest the boarding of one of its vessels
when there is probable cause to believe that it is smuggling
drugs. To do so would be to argue that the principle of the
freedom of the seas allows its ships to engage in conduct which
adversely affects the peace and security of the United States.
If the protective principle is used in this limited fashion against
such a universally recognized evil as narcotics smuggling, and
66. Id. at 57-63.
67. Estimates place the number of drug addicts as high as 800,000. See Cimino,
Narcotic Addiction in the United States: A Nationwide Survey, 2 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROB. 401, 414 (1973). The cost in terms of narcotics-related theft ranges up to two
billion dollars. See DRUG ABUSE SURVEY PROJECT, DEALING wiTH DRUG ABUSE: A REPORT
TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 6 (1972).
68. Currently, the Coast Guard must request the State Department to obtain
permission from the nation whose flag a foreign vessel is flying before boarding. Coast
Guard Drug Interdiction: Hearings on H.R. 10371 and H.R. 10698 Before the Sub-
comm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1978) (statement of Admiral Venzke).
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if the necessary diplomatic steps are taken, there should be no
serious protests from other nations.
Edward Thomas Meyer
IMPEACHING THE DECEASED EXCITED UTTERANCE DECLARANT
The victim, within fifteen minutes of the shooting, re-
sponded to questions asked by a witness and stated that the
defendants and a third person had shot her. She also identified
as one of her assailants a person against whom she had testified
in connection with the slaying of her brother. The trial judge
admitted these statements into evidence under the excited ut-
terances exception to the hearsay rule. For impeachment pur-
poses, the defendants requested the court to order the state to
furnish them with any information it had concerning prior con-
victions of the victim.I The trial judge denied the request based
on his belief that the out-of-court statement of the victim
would not be susceptible to impeachment. The defendants also
requested the court to order the prosecution to produce a police
department press release issued to local newspapers which re-
sulted in media reports that the victim, after being shown pho-
tographs, identified as one of her attackers a person then in the
state penitentiary.' This information was also to be used to
discredit the statements of the victim, but the trial court de-
nied this request as well. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that because the excited utterance is effectively a testimonial
statement, its introduction should render the declarant suscep-
tible to impeachment in the same manner as other witnesses.
State v. Henderson, 362 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1978).
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is an
1. State v. Henderson, 362 So. 2d 1358, 1363 (La. 1978). Although it is not clear
under what authority defense counsel made the request for information concerning
possible prior conviction records of the victim, the court held that this was a specific
and relevant request for evidence materially favorable to the accused which should
have been complied with under United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); State v.
Harvey, 358 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1978); and State v. May, 339 So. 2d 764 (La. 1976). 362
So. 2d at 1363.
2. The court again held this to be a specific and relevant request for evidence
materially favorable to the accused. 362 So. 2d at 1364. See note 1, supra.
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